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INTRODUCTION
Thank you, Dean Martin, and thank you to the members of the

Fordham Urban Law Journal for putting together this event and
giving me the opportunity to speak to you all today.
What I would like to do in the time I have is to try and provide a
bit of background for some of the debate on the Second Amendment
that you will hear later today. To that end, I am going to try to
summarize how the Supreme Court has interpreted the Second
Amendment, most importantly focusing on the 2008 and 2010
decisions in District of Columbia v. Heller1 and McDonald v. City of
Chicago.2 Please know that I speak today not on behalf of the
Department of Justice or the United States Attorney’s Office, and
any opinions or beliefs that I express are my own and not necessarily
those of the Department.
I. THE TEXT OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT
A natural place to start is with the text of the amendment itself.
The Second Amendment reads: “A well regulated Militia, being
necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to
keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”3 The amendment
contains two parts: the prefatory language, “A well regulated Militia,
being necessary to the security of a free State,” and the operative
part, “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be
infringed.” How to interpret the relationship between the prefatory
language and the operative language is the cornerstone of the debate
in the Supreme Court’s 2008 decision in District of Columbia v.
Heller.4 Does the operative language, “the right of the people to keep
and bear arms, shall not be infringed,” only apply when arms are kept
or carried in connection with a military purpose? Or does the
prefatory language concerning the necessity of a militia merely
provide the backdrop against which the Founders felt it necessary to
codify an individual right of “the people” to keep and bear arms—
whether or not the use of arms is related to military use?
The Supreme Court did not address this issue of linguistics and the
Founders’ intent until the Heller decision in 2008. Commentators on
both sides of this issue have argued that the Court’s silence on this
1.
2.
3.
4.

District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010).
U.S. CONST. amend. II.
See Heller, 554 U.S. at 577–78, 598–600; id. at 643–44 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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topic suggests that one way or the other, before Heller there really
was no serious debate about the meaning of the Second Amendment.
Depending on your viewpoint, the Court in Heller, in finding that the
Second Amendment protects an individual’s right to bear arms in
non-military conduct, either affirmed a well-accepted principle or, on
the other hand, expanded the scope of the right under the Second
Amendment, despite the plain language concerning the militia, to
create a constitutionally protected individual right to bear arms when
such a constitutional right had never existed before nor was intended
to exist by the Founders.
II. SUPREME COURT DECISIONS A NALYZING THE SECOND
AMENDMENT
Interestingly, before Heller and McDonald, the Second
Amendment rarely was a source of much interest for the Supreme
Court. Indeed, prior to the 2008 Heller decision, the meaning and
scope of the Second Amendment seems only to have been the focus
of three Supreme Court decisions.5 I will discuss each of those briefly.
First, in 1876, the Supreme Court in United States v. Cruikshank,6 a
few years after passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, addressed
whether the Second Amendment applies by its own force to anyone
other than the Federal Government.7 The Court concluded that the
Second Amendment means no more than that the right to keep and
bear arms shall not be infringed by Congress, and that states were
free to protect or restrict that right under their police powers.8
In 1886, the Supreme Court in Presser v. Illinois upheld a state law
that forbade bodies of men to associate together as military
organizations, or to drill or parade with arms in cities and towns
unless authorized by law.9 The Court upheld the law and affirmed its
holding in Cruikshank that the Second Amendment is only a
limitation upon the power of Congress and the national government,
and not upon that of the states.10 The Court also found that the state

5. See generally Miller v. Texas, 153 U.S. 535 (1894); Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S.
252 (1886); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876).
6. 92 U.S. 542.
7. See id. at 550–51.
8. See id. at 553.
9. Presser, 116 U.S. at 253.
10. See id. at 264–65.
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law did not violate a citizen’s rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment.11
In 1927 and 1934, Congress passed what Justice Stevens’s
dissenting opinion in Heller characterized as the first federal laws
directly restricting civilian use of firearms.12 The 1927 Act prohibited
mail delivery of firearms capable of being concealed on one’s
person.13 The 1934 Act prohibited the possession of sawed off
shotguns and machine guns.14
The 1934 Act came under review in the 1939 Supreme Court
decision United States v. Miller,15 the third and final Second
Amendment Supreme Court decision preceding Heller and
McDonald. In Miller, the Supreme Court upheld the 1934 Act
outlawing possession of, among other things, a short barrel shotgun.16
The Supreme Court reasoned that since there was no evidence that a
short barrel shotgun has “some reasonable relationship to the
preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia, we cannot say
that the Second Amendment guarantees the right to keep and bear
such an instrument.”17 As I will discuss in a moment, how to interpret
the holding in Miller is one of the central disagreements between the
majority and dissent in Heller.
III. THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION IN DISTRICT OF

COLUMBIA V. HELLER
So let’s discuss Heller. In the pivotal 5-4 decision, the Supreme
Court reviewed District of Columbia ordinances that generally
prohibited the possession of handguns.18 Specifically, it was a crime in
Washington D.C. “to carry an unregistered firearm, and the
registration of handguns [was] prohibited.”19 “District of Columbia
law also require[d] residents to keep their lawfully owned firearms,

11. See id. at 266.
12. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 675 (2008) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
13. See id. (citing Act of Feb. 8, 1927, ch. 75, 44 Stat. 1059).
14. See id. (citing National Firearms Act, ch. 757, 48 Stat. 1236 (1934) (codified as
amended at 26 U.S.C. 5801-5849 (2006))).
15. 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
16. See id. at 178.
17. Id.
18. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 574.
19. Id. at 574-75.
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such as registered long guns, ‘unloaded and disassembled or bound by
a trigger lock or similar device’ . . . .”20
The majority opinion, written by Justice Scalia, held that the
Second Amendment protects an individual’s right to possess a firearm
unconnected with service in militia, and to use that firearm for
traditionally lawful purposes, such as self-defense within the home.21
Scalia reasoned that the Second Amendment’s prefatory clause—“A
well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free
State”—did not limit or expand the operative clause of the
amendment—“the right of the people to keep and bear Arms shall
not be infringed.”22 Scalia wrote that the operative clause’s text and
history—including
its
legislative
history,
post-ratification
commentary, and the limited jurisprudence analyzing the Second
Amendment that I just very briefly discussed—all support a reading
that the Second Amendment protects an individual’s right to keep
and bear arms.23 Scalia reasoned that the prefatory language
announced the purpose for which the right to bear arms was codified,
but did not contain all components of the right.24 Scalia wrote, “[T]he
threat that the new Federal Government would destroy the citizens’
militia by taking away their arms was the reason that right—unlike
some other English rights—was codified in a written Constitution.”25
Scalia noted, however, that “[t]he prefatory clause does not suggest
that preserving the militia was the only reason Americans valued the
ancient right; most undoubtedly thought it even more important for
self-defense and hunting.”26
The majority found that the handgun ban amounted to a
prohibition on an entire class of firearms that Americans choose for
the lawful purpose of self-defense.27 The majority opinion noted that
the complete prohibition of handguns would fail either intermediate
or strict scrutiny but, interestingly, declined to adopt a specific
standard of review.28 Scalia wrote, “[S]ince this case represents this
Court’s first in-depth examination of the Second Amendment, one
20. Id. at 575 (quoting D.C. CODE § 7-2507.02 (2009), amended by 56 D.C. Reg.
1365 (2009)).
21. See id. at 635.
22. Id. at 577.
23. See id. at 579-620.
24. See id. at 599.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. See id. at 628.
28. See id. at 634-35.
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should not expect it to clarify the entire field.”29 The Court also
found that the requirement that any lawful firearm in the home be
disassembled or bound by a trigger lock makes it impossible for
citizens to use arms for the core lawful purpose of self-defense, and is
therefore unconstitutional.30
The majority was careful to note that, like most rights, the right
secured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited.31 Not purporting
to have made an exhaustive list, the Court mentioned some of the
permissible restrictions on possession of firearms, namely
prohibitions on the possession of firearms by convicted felons and the
mentally ill; laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive
places such as schools; laws imposing conditions and qualifications on
the commercial sale of firearms; and, in keeping with the majority’s
reading of Miller, prohibitions on firearms that are not in common
use at the time.32
Returning to Miller for a moment, the 1939 case held that Congress
may prohibit or restrict possession of guns that have no reasonable
relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated
militia.33 The majority in Heller interpreted Miller to mean that
certain types of weapons are not protected under the Second
Amendment—not that a weapon must be used in connection with
military activity to be protected—but rather that Miller asks whether
the gun at issue is of a type that is related to the preservation or
efficiency of the military.34 The majority went on to say that arms that
have some relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well
regulated militia are not necessarily those weapons that are most
commonly used by the military but rather those that are in common
usage at the time.35 So put another way, the majority in Heller
interpreted Miller to hold that the Second Amendment protects an
individual’s right to bear arms that are commonly used at that time.
Justice Stevens, dissenting in Heller, interpreted Miller to mean
that the Second Amendment only protects the right to bear arms
insofar as it is connected with military usage.36 Stevens wrote:

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id. at 635.
See id. at 630.
See id. at 595.
See id. at 626-27.
United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939).

See Heller, 554 U.S. at 622-25.
See id. at 624-25.
See id. at 637-38 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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[I]f the Second Amendment were not limited in its coverage to
military uses of weapons, why should the Court in Miller have
suggested that some weapons but not others were eligible for
Second Amendment protection? If use for self-defense were the
relevant standard, why did the Court not inquire into the suitability
of a particular weapon for self-defense purposes?37

The dissent’s disagreement over the majority’s interpretation of

Miller spills into the heart of the dispute in Heller. As Justice Stevens
wrote in dissent:
The view of the amendment we took in Miller—that it protects the
right to keep and bear arms for certain military purposes, but that it
does not curtail the Legislature’s power to regulate the nonmilitary
use and ownership of weapons—is both the most natural reading of
the Amendment’s text and the interpretation most faithful to the
history of its adoption.38

Justice Stevens also took issue with Justice Scalia’s mode of
statutory construction, which in the eyes of the dissent relegated the
prefatory language concerning the militia to merely contextual
information.39 Quoting Marbury v. Madison, Stevens wrote that “[i]t
cannot be presumed that any clause in the constitution is intended to
be without effect.”40
The dissent, like the majority opinion, looked at the legislative and
post-ratification history of the amendment but came to a far different
conclusion.41
In particular, Justice Stevens focused on James
Madison’s consideration and rejection of potential formulations of
the amendment that would have, in the words of Justice Stevens,
“unambiguously protected civilian use of firearms.”42 Specifically, the
dissent focused on proposed language from New Hampshire that
stated, “Congress shall never disarm any Citizen unless such as are or
have been in Actual Rebellion,”43 and proposals considered in other
states, including Madison’s native Virginia, that defined the right to
bear arms in more clearly personal terms.44

37. Id. at 677.
38. Id. at 637-38.
39. See id. at 643-44.
40. Id. at 643 (alteration in original) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137, 174 (1803)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
41. See id. at 641-62.
42. Id. at 660.
43. Id. at 657.
44. Id. at 659-60.
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Justice Breyer joined in Justice Stevens’ dissent and also dissented
on the ground that even if the Second Amendment could be
construed to protect a civilian’s non-military bearing of arms, the
Washington D.C. regulation, in the words of Justice Breyer, “which
focuses upon the presence of handguns in high-crime urban areas,
represents a permissible legislative response to a serious, indeed lifethreatening, problem.”45 Justice Breyer criticized the majority for not
setting forth a standard of review and noted that if, for instance,
“rational basis” review were the proper standard, the legislation
would undoubtedly pass that test.46 Justice Breyer went on to write
that adoption of a strict scrutiny standard of review—under which a
gun law would be reviewed to determine whether it is narrowly
tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest—would be
impossible.47 Reasoning that since almost every gun control law will
seek to advance a primary concern of the government (the safety of
its citizens)—and such an interest has been determined in other cases
to be compelling—any attempt to apply strict scrutiny would in
practice turn into an interest balancing inquiry “with the interests
protected by the Second Amendment on one side and the
governmental public-safety concerns on the other, the only question
being whether the regulation at issue impermissibly burdens the
former in the course of advancing the latter.”48 Justice Breyer
therefore recommended simply adopting an interest-balancing
inquiry explicitly as the appropriate standard of review.49
Justice Breyer concluded that in light of the compelling
government interest in the safety of its citizens, and since self-defense
is not the primary interest advanced by the Second Amendment—
rather, the preservation of the militia is—the Washington D.C. laws
did not disproportionately burden Amendment-protected interests.
Therefore, in his eyes, even assuming that the Second Amendment
protects the right to self-defense, the Washington D.C. regulations
pass constitutional muster.50
After the majority holding in Heller, it is now clear that the Second
Amendment protects an individual’s right to bear arms in the home
for the lawful purpose of self-defense. As I noted, the decision did

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id. at 681-82 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
See id. at 687-88.
See id. at 689.
Id.
See id.
See id. at 720-23.
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leave certain areas, such as standard of review, open for debate. The
Heller decision also was silent on whether the Fourteenth
Amendment incorporated the Second Amendment right to keep and
bear arms for the purpose of self-defense.51
IV. THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION IN MCDONALD V. CITY OF

CHICAGO
In 2010, the Supreme Court in McDonald addressed whether, in
the wake of Heller, the Fourteenth Amendment makes the Second
Amendment right to keep and bear arms fully applicable to the
States.52
Under review in McDonald were Chicago laws that prohibited
handgun possession similar to the DC regulations at issue in Heller.53
The municipalities of Chicago and Oak Park argued that their laws
were constitutional because the Second Amendment has no
application to the States.54
However, Justice Alito, writing a plurality opinion for the Court,
held that the Second Amendment right was applicable to the States
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,55 which
provides that no State may deprive any person of life, liberty or
property, without due process of the law.56 Justice Alito recognized
that earlier Second Amendment opinions of the Supreme Court in
Cruikshank, Presser, and Miller held that the Second Amendment
applies only to the Federal Government and not to the states.57
However, Justice Alito found that those decisions “preceded the era
in which the Court began the process of ‘selective incorporation’
under the Due Process Clause, and [that the Supreme Court had]
never previously addressed the question whether the right to keep
and bear arms applies to the States under that theory.”58
Applying the test set forth in the Supreme Court’s decision in
Duncan v. Louisiana, the Court analyzed whether the right protected
by the Second Amendment is fundamental to the nation’s scheme of

51. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3027 (2010) (citing NRA,
Inc. v. Vill. of Oak Park, 617 F. Supp. 2d 752, 754 (N.D. Ill. 2008)).
52. See id. at 3026.
53. See id.
54. See id.
55. See id.
56. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
57. See McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3030.
58. Id. at 3031.
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ordered liberty;59 or applying the test from Washington v. Gluckberg,
whether it is “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition”
and, therefore, incorporated from the Bill of Rights into the
Fourteenth Amendment and applied to the States.60 Justice Alito
remarked, “Our decision in Heller points unmistakably to the answer.
Self-defense is a basic right, recognized by many legal systems from
ancient times to the present day, and in Heller, we held that
individual self-defense is ‘the central component’ of the Second
Amendment right.”61
Justice Alito rejected the municipal
respondents’ argument that the central component of the right was as
a means of preserving the militia, and not self-defense.62 The plurality
opinion then went on to recount the legislative history of the
amendment and the post-ratification history of the amendment that
demonstrated that the Framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth
Amendment counted the right to keep and bear arms among those
fundamental rights necessary to our system of ordered liberty.63
Justice Alito also reaffirmed, as provided in Heller, that the right to
keep and bear arms is not limitless and incorporation of the Second
Amendment right through the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to make that right applicable to the states did not
disturb certain longstanding regulatory measures such as prohibitions
on the possession of firearms by felons and forbidding the carrying of
firearms in sensitive areas such as schools.64
Justice Thomas concurred in part with the plurality opinion and
concurred in the judgment.65 He agreed that the Fourteenth
Amendment makes the right to keep and bear arms, as set forth in
the Second Amendment, fully applicable to the States but wrote
separately because he believed that the right is incorporated, not
through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, but
rather through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges and
Immunities Clause.66 The Privileges and Immunities Clause of
Fourteenth Amendment provides that a State may not “abridge the
59. See 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).
60. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3036 (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S.
702, 721 (1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
61. Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570,
599 (2008)).
62. See id. at 3048.
63. See id. at 3037-42.
64. See id. at 3047.
65. See id. at 3058 (Thomas, J., concurring).
66. See id. at 3059.
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privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.”67 The scope
of rights protected under the Privileges and Immunities Clause, as
many of you well know, has been construed rather narrowly since the
landmark Slaughter-House Cases68 of the nineteenth century and the
proper interpretation of that clause is an issue that has been the
source of much scholarly debate. Justice Thomas argued, among
other things, that the Privileges and Immunities Clause protects
constitutionally protected rights, including the right to keep and bear
arms.69
There were two dissenting opinions in McDonald, again penned by
Justice Stevens and Justice Breyer. Much of Justice Stevens’ dissent,
like Justices Scalia and Thomas’ concurring opinions, is spent
analyzing the proper interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment.70
Justice Stevens argued that the Supreme Court had already decided
in Cruikshank, Presser, and Miller that the Second Amendment right
had not been incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment.71 Thus,
Justice Stevens framed the question as whether the particular right
asserted by petitioners—to bear arms in the home for the purpose of
self-defense—applies to the States “because of the Fourteenth
Amendment itself, standing on its own bottom.”72 Justice Stevens
then undertook to analyze whether the right to bear arms in the home
constitutes a “liberty” interest within the meaning of the substantive
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.73 He ultimately
concluded that on the facts before the Court in this case,
[h]aving failed to show why their asserted interest is intrinsic to the
concept of ordered liberty or vulnerable to maltreatment in the
political arena, [petitioners] have failed to show why “the word
liberty in the Fourteenth Amendment” should be “held to prevent
the natural outcome of a dominant opinion” about how to deal with
the problem of handgun violence in the city of Chicago.74

Justice Breyer focused his dissenting opinion on whether the right
to bear arms in the home for self-defense was “sufficiently
‘fundamental’” to warrant incorporation and “remove it from the
67. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
68. 83 U.S. 36 (1872).
69. See McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3068 (Thomas, J., concurring).
70. See McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3090-3103 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
71. See id. at 3088 & n.1.
72. Id. at 3103.
73. See id. at 3103-07.
74. Id. at 3116 (quoting Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting)).
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political process in every state.”75 He was critical of Justice Alito’s
opinion for relying just on the historical status of the right in
determining whether it was fundamental to the American scheme of
justice.76 Breyer wrote that other considerations should bear on the
calculus, such as: “the nature of the right; any contemporary
disagreement about whether the right is fundamental; [and] the
extent to which incorporation [would] further other . . . constitutional
aims.”77 He concluded that incorporation was not appropriate
because, among other things, “[i]n sum, the police power, the
superiority of legislative decisionmaking, the need for local
decisionmaking, the comparative desirability of democratic
decisionmaking, the lack of a manageable judicial standard, and the
life-threatening harm that may flow from striking down regulations
all argue against incorporation.”78 Justice Breyer went on to write
that “the important factors that favor incorporation in other
instances—e.g., the protection of broader constitutional objectives—
are not present here.”79
V. ISSUES BEING LITIGATED POST-HELLER AND POST-

MCDONALD
So, as we just discussed, Heller establishes that the Second
Amendment protects the right to bear arms in the home for the
lawful purpose of self-defense,80 and McDonald incorporates that
right through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
so that it is applicable to the states.81
In the wake of Heller and McDonald, several issues are being
litigated across the country. I would like to close my remarks today
by highlighting a few of those, and I’m sure your panelists will raise
others throughout the day.
One issue being litigated is whether the holding in Heller protects
gun possession outside of the home. As Justice Alito in McDonald
described the central holding in Heller: “the Second Amendment
protects a personal right to keep and bear arms for lawful purposes,

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id. at 3123 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
See id. at 3122.
Id. at 3123.
Id. at 3129.
Id.
See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 573-626 (2008); supra Part

III.
81. See McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3028-30, 3031-44; supra Part IV.
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most notably for self-defense within the home.”82 The question has
arisen in several litigations of what, if any, Second Amendment
protections are available outside of the home.83 As noted in some of
those cases, there is language in Heller that suggests that the right
also applies to keeping and bearing arms in public. For example, the
Court in Heller more generally referred to an individual’s right “to
possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation.”84 Litigants all
over the country are arguing both sides—on the one hand that the
right only attaches to firearms in the home and on the other hand that
the right extends outside of the home—and I imagine panelists today
will argue both sides of that issue.
A second issue that has arisen at the trial court level is what other
categories of prohibitions or restrictions on gun possession qualify as
public safety exceptions. As we discussed, the Supreme Court
recognized certain public safety exceptions to the reach of the
protection afforded under the Second Amendment (such as
forbidding guns in school and prohibiting convicted felons from
possessing guns), but conceded that list was not necessarily
exhaustive.85 Whether other categories of gun prohibitions or
restrictions, if any, fall into the public safety exception is another
issue that is being litigated in several courts.86
Finally, parties are litigating over the correct standard of scrutiny
to apply in analyzing a regulation that prohibits or restricts gun
possession.87 As I mentioned earlier, the Court in Heller declined to
set forth a standard of review for gun control laws.88 McDonald also
did not establish a standard of review.89 Many scholars, and certainly
82. Id. at 3044.
83. See, e.g., United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 475–76 (4th Cir. 2011)
(reserving the question of whether the Second Amendment right to bear arms
extends outside the home); People v. Aguilar, 944 N.E.2d 816, 827 (Ill. App. Ct.
2011), leave for appeal granted, 949 N.E.2d 1099 (Ill. 2011); Williams v. State, 10
A.3d 1167, 1177 (Md. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 93 (2011).
84. Heller, 554 U.S. at 592.
85. See id. at 626-27.
86. See, e.g., United States v. Young, 58 F. App’x 980 (4th Cir. 2003) (applying
public safety exception where officers ask a handcuffed defendant if there is a gun in
the home); United States v. Reynolds, 334 F. Supp. 2d 909 (W.D. Va. 2004)
(considering whether public safety exception applies when officers are voluntarily
given a gun by defendant and ask if defendant has any other weapons in the house).
87. See, e.g., Nordyke v. King, 681 F.3d 1041, 1045–46 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc)
(O’Scannlain, J., concurring); Osterweil v. Bartlett, 819 F. Supp. 2d 72, 84 (N.D.N.Y.
2011).
88. See generally Heller, 554 U.S. 570.
89. See generally McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010).
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litigants and courts across the country, have pored over those
decisions, particularly Heller, to argue which standard of scrutiny is
suggested by the Court’s opinions. Some argue that the holding in
Heller suggests that strict scrutiny applies since it terms the right to
possess arms in the home for self-defense as a “fundamental right.”90
On the other hand, some have argued that intermediate scrutiny
seems to apply because it termed the public safety exceptions to the
Second Amendment as “presumptively constitutional” whereas under
strict scrutiny they would presumptively be unconstitutional.91 Some
have argued for the interest balancing approach that Justice Breyer
advocated in his dissent in Heller and others have attempted hybrid
approaches.92
CONCLUSION
These are only some of the issues that are being litigated in
courthouses all over our country post-Heller and McDonald, and I
am sure the panelists will debate these and other issues throughout
the day.
I would again like to thank Fordham Law and the Fordham Urban
Law Journal for the opportunity to speak with you this morning. I
hope you all enjoy the symposium. Thank you very much.

90. See Lawrence Rosenthal & Joyce Lee Malcolm, Colloquy Debate, McDonald
v. Chicago: Which Standard of Scrutiny Should Apply to Gun Control Laws?, 105
NW. U. L. REV. 437 (2011).
91. See, e.g., United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 460 (4th Cir. 2011);
United States v. Miller, 604 F. Supp. 2d 1162, 1170-71 (W.D. Tenn. 2009) (collecting
cases).
92. See State v. Brown, 815 N.W.2d 407 (Wis. 2012) (reasonableness test); People
v. Williams, 962 N.E.2d 1148, 1153-54 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011) (rational basis test).

